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VIRGINIA'S INSANITY DEFENSE: REFORM IS IMPERATIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
Rivers of ink, mountains of printer's lead, forests of paper have been ex-
pended on this issue [the insanity defense], which is surely marginal to the
chaotic problem of effective, rational, and humane prevention and treatment
of crime.'
Virginia is no exception to the statement that a great deal of time and
energy has been expended by writers in addressing the defense of insanity.
Unfortunately, instead of generating some notable reform, this fact has
served to desensitize the legislators, the legal profession, and the public in
this controversial area. 2 In view of the current knowledge in the field of
psychiatry, the approach for implementing the insanity defense in Virginia
courts is not satisfactory.
3
The significance of the insanity defense is increasing with changing
views in criminal law as well as new developments in the psychiatric field.
Many judges feel that existing concepts for determining the conditions of
guilt and punishability are set forth with adequate clarity. But it has been
recognized that perceptive legal scholars have expressed skepticism in
these areas for some time.4 Dean Roscoe Pound has expressed this skepti-
1. Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. Rav. 514, 516 (1968).
2. A survey of current Virginia law indicates an absence of legislative action in regard to
the applicable formulation of the insanity test. Case law in Virginia indicates no significant
reform in the insanity test for almost a century. See Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va.
867 (1881). The test applied by the court in Dejarnette was the M'Naghten right-wrong test
supplemented by a modified irresistible impulse formulation. For a description of the test see
note 26, infra.
3. In 1838 Issac Ray, M.D., made the extremely perceptive statement: "Few, probably,
whose attention has not been particularly directed to the subject are aware how far the
condition of the law relative to insanity is behind the present state of our knowledge concern-
ing that disease." This statement was five years before the trial of Daniel M'Naghten which
led to what is known as the M'Naghten rules. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.
1843). "These rules have been the guiding principal for most of the English-speaking world
in criminal cases where insanity has been raised as a defense." Dearman, Criminal Responsi-
bility and the Insanity Tests: A Psychiatrist Looks at Three Cases, 47 VA. L. REv. 1388 (1961).
One hundred and thirty-five years have passed since these rules were put into effect. Needless
to say, there have been many advances made by medical psychology during that time (Freud
did not develop his theory of the unconscious until 1890) which the courts have been unable
to use because of the M'Naghten formulation. The dissatisfaction among the members of the
medical profession has, consequently, been exceedingly high. Id.; see A. GoLDsTEIN, THE
INSANrrv DEFENSE 68, 75-77 (1967). In criticizing the irresistible impulse test, Judge Bazelon
stated that it gives "no recognition to mental illness charcterized by brooding reflection and
so relegates acts caused by such illness to the application of the inadequate right-wrong test."
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
4. S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: COLD WAR OR ENTENTE CORDIALE? 9-10 (1962).
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cism as to the well known legal concept of "criminal intent." He notes that
substantive criminal law has been based on the theory of punishing the
"vicious will" while assuming a free agent confronted with a choice be-
tween doing right and wrong and choosing freely to do wrong. A further
assumption made is that the social interest in the general morals is to be
maintained by imposing upon him a penalty corresponding exactly to the
gravity of his offense. "However, Pound points out, as a matter of fact 'We
know that the old analysis of the act and intent can stand only as an
artificial legal analysis and that the mental elements in crime present a
series of difficult problems.' "" Dean Pound was correct in this statement
since studies of motivating traits and factors of criminalism show that in
most instances there is little 'free will' in the simple, naive sense of the
traditional criminal law.' The importance and difficulty of the defense of
insanity increasingly confronts criminal jurisprudence in that the various
approaches are founded on a legal proposition about which Pound and
others have raised such serious doubts-"the proposition, namely, that no
person can be held criminally liable and punishable for an unlawful act,
unless he has 'sufficient mental capacity' to 'entertain a criminal intent,'
or to have a mens rea .... 7
Recent developments relating to the constitutional rights of mentally
disordered defendants indicate that the insanity defense will appear more
frequently' in the courtrooms of Virginia.' Six years ago, in Jackson v.
Indiana,"0 it was settled that mentally abnormal defendants can no longer
be indeterminately committed to a mental hospital as incompetent to
stand trial. Consequently, more defendants with mental abnormalities and
potential insanity defenses will be returned to court for trial." The Code
of Virginia 2 indicates that confinement for an indefinite period does not
5. Id. at 10 (quoting R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 586 (1922)).
6. S. GLUECK, supra note 4, at 10.
7. Id.
8. G. MORRIS, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 6-7 (1967).
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
10. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). The Supreme Court held:
[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on
account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable
period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that
he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is
not the case, then the State must either institute the customazy civil commitment
proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release
the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon
will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress
toward that goal.
Id. (footnote omitted).
11. G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 7.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(1)(Cum. Supp. 1978). The Code provides that upon acquittal
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automatically follow an acquittal by reason of insanity so that "defendants
who were mentally disordered at the time the. . . act was committed may
be more willing to assert the insanity defense."' 3 With the ever-increasing
significance of the criminal responsibility issue, Virginia must strive to
solve the difficult problems of the insanity defense.
"It has been said that the measure of a civilization is the way in which
it treats the most despised among us."' 4 This, of course, refers to the
treatment of the insane and of the criminal. The two avowed functions of
the criminal process should be, "first, to find the truth and second, and
equally important, to do so by a fair and civilized process. '"'5 The approach
any state uses to determine insanity and, ultimately, criminal responsibil-
ity, should be viewed in respect to these two praiseworthy goals.
This article discusses the current Virginia approach concerning the in-
sanity defense. After evaluating this approach, by considering the field of
psychiatry and the law of criminal responsibility, a recommendation is
advanced in order to effectuate a long-needed change in Virginia. A change
which should enable the courts to determine criminal responsibility in a
fair and rational manner.
11. PROBLEMS IN DEVELOPING AN INsANrrY DEFENSE
There are many issues underlying the determination of criminal respon-
sibility.'6 First, it must be recognized that an appropriate solution to the
on the ground of insanity:
[Tihe court shall place him [defendant] in temporary custody of the Commissioner
of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, . . . and appoint three physicians or two
physicians and one clinical psychologist, skilled in the diagnosis of insanity and feeble-
mindedness, to examine the defendant and make such investigation as they deem
necessary in order to determine whether, at the time of their examination, he is insane
or feebleminded and to determine whether his discharge would be dangerous to the
public peace and safety or to himself and to report their findings to the court. If the
court is satisfied [that he is insane or dangerous] by the report, . . . the court shall
order him to be committed to the custody of the commissioner. Otherwise, the defen-
dant forthwith shall be discharged and released.
Id.
13. G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 7.
14. This statement was made by Professor Foster of the New York University School of
Law during a New York University Colloquium on "President Nixon's Proposal on the Insan-
ity Defense." lFall, 1973] Journal of Psychiatry and Law 297 excerpts reprinted in RADNGs
IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 711 (R. Allen ed., rev. and exp. ed. 1975).
15. Id.
16. This section is only intended to include those basic considerations relevant to develop-
ing a framework in which to apply the insanity defense. For a more thorough coverage of this
area see H. FINGARErE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANrrY (1972); S. GLUECK, supra note 4,
at 3-40; M. GMThIACHER, THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN LAW (1968); A. GoLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY
DEFENSE (1967); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1447-66 (1956).
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insanity defense necessarily requires the cooperation of two professions
which have opposing viewpoints. The law is developed from and based on
the idea of precedence, that is, legal decisions justified by previous deci-
sions. Psychiatry, on the other hand, is an evolving science whose profes-
sion has only recently contributed its most valuable skills and knowledge.
Logically, then, any law defining the test of insanity which is based totally
on the idea of precedence will be denying valuable progress made by psy-
chiatry. Cooperation in this setting is impossible. The resulting distrust
causes lawyers to look upon "psychiatrists as fuzzy apologists for crimi-
nals" when the psychiatrist expounds current psychiatric theory. Simi-
larly, "psychiatrists tend to regard lawyers as devious and cunning phrase-
mongers" when the lawyer demands that the psychiatrist formulate his
answers according to specific questions. 7
Second, in recognizing the necessity of admitting psychiatric testimony
as to the mental capacity of the defendant at the time of the act, 8 it is
clear that procedures utilized by the court must allow the psychiatrist to
function within the legal framework. The difficulty arises in that the law,
in its definition of crime and provision of the requisites. for relief from
responsibility, "omits psychological and sociological considerations which
psychiatrists regard to be crucially significant to the explanation of con-
duct." The requirements of the technical, substantive law as to the causa-
tion of conduct do not describe the entire chain of psychological causation
that resulted in the act.2" No provision is made for motives of the act except
for a few specific crimes and "certainly unconscious motivation is not all
relevant in the law." 2'
Psychiatry is endeavoring to help the judiciary by its presentation of its
knowledge of human behavior in deciding who should be treated and who
should be punished .... [P]sychiatry does have considerable knowledge of
human behavior and personality, and it does wish to be allowed to present
17. S. GLUECK, supra note 4, at 4-5.
18. The mens rea (a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent) and the
actus reus (guilty act or deed of crime) must concur to constitute a true crime, which is a
crime requiring some form of criminal intent. In order to be held responsible and blameworthy
for the act one must have had the criminal capacity for the requisite criminal intent. The
actor who does not have the criminal capacity at the time of the actus reus is entitled to an
acquittal. Mental disease or defect can serve as a limitation on criminal capacity so that
psychiatric testimony on this subject is imperative. See generally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 739-47, 834-36, 850-58 (2d ed. 1969).
19. S. GLUECK, supra note 4, at 30.
20. Id. at 30, 31.
21. "This disregard of motive extends to the prevailing tests of irresponsibility of the insane
in their ignoring of the most significant of all psychological forerunners and accompaniers of
acts of crime as well as of ordinary behavior; namely, the affective or emotional aspects of
mental life." Id. at 31.
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this knowledge to the court. It seeks to do this in such a manner that a judge
and jury will understand and be able to follow its reasoning to a logical
conclusion. To do this, the court must not limit what the psychiatrist says
nor how he can say it. He must not be restricted to moral conclusions of right
or wrong or legal determinations of sanity or insanity. The psychiatrist needs
to be able to relate fully to the court what he knows of the total personality
of the person on trial. .... 2
Third, there is some confusion as to which of the four traditional pur-
poses of criminal law is considered more important: (1) physical isolation
of the individual offender to prevent his committing further antisocial acts;
(2) reform, rehabilitation, and treatment to lower the probability of the
commission of further offenses; (3) general deterrence which reduces the
probability by general threat of criminal sanction; (4) retributive justice
in that society should exact suffering from an individual. This decision
should be made so society can combine the best available scientific infor-
mation as to the effectiveness of the various procedures utilized to achieve
the desired result.n
Fourth, "[a] basic ethical and psychological stumbling block in an
analysis of crucial problems of substantive Criminal Law and of sentencing
policy is the ancient enigma about whether man possesses 'freedom of will'
or is instead the deluded plaything of deterministic forces completely and
always beyond his control." In the area of developing an acceptable test
of insanity at the time of the commission of the act, the resolution of this
underlying fundamental issue may well lead to unprecedented ap-
proaches.2s
22. Dearman, supra note 3, at 1391.
23. Meehl, Psychology and Criminal Law, 5 U. RicH. L. Rav. 1 (1970). For further discus-
sion on the consequences of this confusion see A. GoLDsTmN, supra note 16, at 11-15.
24. S. GLUECK, supra note 4, at 5-6.
25. This issue usually exposes the two diametrically opposed viewpoints: (1) "those who
stress the prime social need of blameworthiness and retributive punishment as the core-
concept in crime and justice," and (2) those who, under the impact of psychoanalytic views,
"insist that man's choices are the product of forces largely beyond his conscious control, and
that simply to blame and punish is neither to understand nor to cure the offender, nor in the
long run to protect society." Id. at 6.
It is clear that freedom of will is the foundation of criminal law. A 1961 decision in the
Eighth Circuit United States Court of Appeals, quoting extracts from opinions of Mr. Justice
Cardozo, Mr. Justice Jackson, and Judge Thurman W. Arnold, had this to say:
The law, to this date at least, 'assumes the freedom of will as a working hypothesis in
the solution of its problems' and also assumes 'that mature and rational persons are
in control of their own conduct.' It has been aptly said that 'In the determination of
guilt, age-old conceptions of individual moral responsibility cannot be abandoned
without creating a laxity of enforcement that undermines the whole administration of
criminal law.'
S. GLuECK, supra note 4, at 11 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 753-54 (8th
1979]
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Fifth, an examination of the various insanity tests, which have been
adopted by jurisdictions"5 to determine criminal responsibility, shows
"deceptively simple yet realistically complex, and even baffling, concepts
Cir. 1961) (footnotes omitted)). The traditional tests of insanity have been developed on the
assumptions of the unquestionable possession of freedom of will and the resultant blamewor-
thiness. Recognition of current sociological, anthropological and psychiatric views which
focus on subconscious forces and crucial early childhood experiences redirects the emphasis
toward sympathetic and therapeutic approaches: A line of reasoning which may necessitate
reworking the total framework for making the criminal responsibility determination.
26. In regard to the history of the development of the various tests of insanity see S. Gray,
The Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary Relevance, 10 AM. CraM.
L. REv. 559 (1972); Note, Modern Insanity Tests - Alternatives, 15 WASHBURN L. J. 88 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Alternatives].
Today, jurisdictions use modifications of four basic tests of insanity:
(1) The M'Naghten rule or right-wrong test state that in order to establish a defense
on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing
of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. "Although commonly
called the right-wrong test, the M'Naghten rule actually has two parts," either of
which exculpates the defendant, i.e., "if he did not have the capacity to understand
the nature and quality of his act or if he lacked the ability to distirguish between right
and wrong with respect to the act." Alternatives, supra note 26, at 93-94.
(2) The so-called irresistible impulse test as a sole standard has not been used by any
jurisdiction. Those jurisdictions accepting it use it in conjunction with and supplemen-
tary to the M'Naghten test. This approach broadens the M'Naghten rules in that an
individual is not criminally responsible under the irresistible impulse test if he had a
mental disease that kept him from controlling his conduct, despite his knowledge of
the nature and quality of his act and his awareness thatit was wrong. S. GLUECK, supra
note 4, at 13.
(3) The Durham or "product" test was an effort to avoid "articulating a particular
test of insanity. Rather, it allows the jury to determine as a question of fact whether
defendant suffered from mental disease depriving him of the capacity to entertain a
criminal intent." 15 WASHBURN L.J. 102 (1976). Judge Bazelon announced this test of
criminal responsibility stating that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d at 875. The question is simply whether the accused acted because of
a mental disorder.
(4) The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code Test [hereinafter referred to as
ALI] reads:
Section 4.01. Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the term 'mental disease or defect' do not include an
abnormality manifested only be repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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embodied in their formulations." Clearly, there is no black and white in
mental illness so that these tests, designed to guide juries in their difficult
determination, all involve the baffling problem of degree.
IU. THE COMMONWEALTH'S APPROACH
The Virginia insanity, defense is quite clear. In 1881, the Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals,2 in Dejarnette v. Commonwealth," set forth the
approved test of insanity:
But in every case, although the accused may be laboring under partial insan-
ity, if he still understands the nature and character of his act and its conse-
quences, and has a knowledge that it is wrong and criminal, and a mental
power sufficient to apply that knowledge to his own case, and to know that
if he does the act he will do wrong and receive punishment, and possesses
withal a will sufficient to restrain the impulse that may arise from a diseased
mind, such partial insanity is not sufficient to exempt him from responsibil-
ity to the law for his crimes.10
This statement of the law is based on the M'Naghten rules, or right-
wrong test,"' and is supplemented by an irresistible impulse modification.32
Dejarnette approved the irresistible impulse test in the underlying phrase
and possesses withal a will sufficient to restrain the impulse that may arise
from a diseased mind. An "irresistible impulse" was defimed as a moral or
homicidal insanity which consists of an irresistible inclination to kill or
commit some other offense, resulting from some unseen pressure on the
mind drawing it to consequences which it sees but cannot avoid, and
placing it under a coercion which, although its results are perceived, it is
incapable of resisting.-"
27. S. GLUECK, supra note 4, at 19-20. The problem revolves around the findings required
by the traditional tests:
[T]he presence (or absence) of a condition that can rightfully be called 'mental
disease' or 'defect' and the extent of the causative linkage between such disorder, if
proved, and the crime. These are obviously questions of degree. They derive in turn
(although this is not obvious on the surface) from the fact of differences in the effect
of various types of mental illness, at different stages, in varyingly endowed and circum-
stanced individuals, on the quantum of capacity for free choice and control.
Id. at 20.
28. The Virginia Supreme Court was previously the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
29. 75 Va. 867 (1881).
30. Id. at 878; see also Thornhill v. Peyton, 285 F. Supp. 604 (W.D. Va. 1968); Jones v.
Commonwealth, 202 Va. 236, 117 S.E.2d 67 (1960); Boswell v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20
Gratt.) 860, 868 (1871).
31. See note 26, supra.
32. Id.
33. 75 Va. at 878. The court in Thompson v. Commonwealth, 19P Va. 704, 717, 70 S.E.2d
284, 291 (1952), utilized the definition of irresistible set forth in 14 AM. JuR. Criminal Law §
35:
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The irresistible impulse doctrine recognized in Virginia is applicable
only to that class of cases where the accused is able to understand the
nature and consequence of his act and knows it is wrong, but his mind has
become so impaired by disease that he is totally deprived of the mental
power to control or restrain the act." Therefore, the irresistible impulse
portion of the insanity defense may in some cases be removed from the
definition.1 As applied in Snider v. Smyth,3" "[a]n irresistible impulse
cannot be considered as the product of a planned act; it comes upon a
person rather hurriedly; it rises quickly; [and] short of interference by a
third party, it is irresistible."3
Although in the final analysis Virginia's approach to the insanity defense
is vulnerable, there have been some who have noted various advantages
and defended the use of similar tests.38 One of the main arguments in
defense of the M'Naghten rule is that the standard is simplistic, under-
standable, and, most importantly, easily applied by a jury of laymen39 who
consider mental illness (in the context of a defense) as a moral problem in
which the ability to distinguish right from wrong is a crucial determina-
tion. Others argue that excluding only those who do not know right from
wrong or the nature and quality of the act promotes crime deterrence; that
[A]n impulse induced by, and growing out of some mental disease affecting the
volitive, as distinguished from perceptive, powers, so that the person afflicted, while
able to undertstand the nature and consequences of the act charged against him and
to perceive that it is wrong, is unable, because of such mental disease, to resist the
impulse to do it. It is to be distinguished from mere passion or overwhelming emotion
not growing out of, and connected with a disease of the mind. Frenzy arising solely
from the passion of anger and jealousy, regardless of how furious, is not insanity.
34. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 718, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (1952); see Davis
v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 681, 682, 204 S.E.2d 272 (1974); Christian v. Commonwealth, 202
Va. 311, 117 S.E.2d 72 (1960); Thurman v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 912, 916, 60 S.E. 99
(1908); Hite v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 489, 492, 31 S.E. 895 (1898); Stover v. Commonwealth,
92 Va. 780, 22 S.E. 874 (1895).
35. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. at 716-18, 70 S.E.2d at 292 (1952). "[Tjhe 'right
or wrong' instruction is predicated on the incapacity of a defendant to distinguish right from
wrong and the irresistible impulse instruction is predicated on the capacity to make such a
distinction. Different evidence is required to support each instruction." Davis v. Common-
wealth, 214 Va. at 682, 204 S.E.2d at 273. Evidence of the ability to diiitinguish right from
wrong is a prerequisite to an irresistible impulse instruction.
36. 187 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Va. 1960), aff'd sub nom., Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683
(4th Cir. 1961); see Snider v. Smyth, 263 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1959).
37. Snider v. Smyth, 187 F. Supp. at 302.
38. See Hall, The M'Naghten Rules and Proposed Alternatives, 49 A.B.A.J. 960 (1963);
Hall, Responsibility and Law: In Defense of the M'Naghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956);
Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 HARV. L. REv. 535, 550 (1917).
39. See R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INsANrry 9 (1967); Slovenko, Psychiatry,
Criminal Law and the Role of the Psychiatrists, [1963] DUKE L.J. 395, 403.
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is, those who are capable of being deterred are subjected to punishment."
One author states that the critics of the M'Naghten rules, as well as public
convention, public attitudes, and procedure, have combined to sustain a
narrow view of M'Naghten so firmly established in popular culture of the
insanity defense as to deny the legal process the opportunity to take a
broader view." It also has been argued that critics who fear the connotation
of "irresistable impulse" and the resultant application of the test do not
actually see how the test is applied. In regard to the actual application of
this test it is simply misnamed. Instead of a restrictive view which re-
quires, first, that the act be the product of an "impulse," and second, that
the -act be sudden and unplanned, most states are concerned with the
capacity for self-control or free choice and do not even refer to an impulse.2
Others have maintained that the irresistible impulse test is flexible and
capable of alleviating those problems of M'Naghten standing alone. The
formulation admits all relevant evidence of a mental condition and does
not restrict expert testimony." Of course, the final contention of those in
favor of retaining the traditional tests is similar to Mr. Justice Clark's
statement in Leland v. Oregon:5
The science of psychiatry has made tremendous strides since that test was
laid down in M'Naghten's Case, but the progress of science has not reached
40. State v. Esser, 16 Wis.2d 567, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962).
41. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 64. He argues further that the critics may be correct
in their allegations that many defendants who are seriously ill are arbitrarily excluded from
the insanity defense, but concludes that the fault lies less with the specific formulation of
the defense and more with its presentation. "The responsible parties are counsel and psychia-
trist who have contributed to a failure of the adversary process, allowing an unwarranted
assumption of what the rule 'must' mean to govern their conception of the defense." Id. But
see U.S. v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 765 (3rd Cir. 1961)(quoting Mr. Justice Frankfurter). "If
you find rules that are, broadly speaking, discredited by those who have to administer them,
which is, I think, the real situation, certainly with us - they are honoured in the breach and
not in the observance - then I think the law serves its best interests by trying to be more
honest about it. . . ." Id. at 765-66.
42. A. GoLsTmN, supra note 16, at 67-79. But see note 36 supra and accompanying text.
The application of the irresistible impulse test in Virginia is heavily pointed toward the
misleading concept of impulse. The probability is high that the juror in Virginia's courts will
get the full effect of such a misnomer. If, in fact, this is a case of misnaming, it is unfortunate
but should not tip the balance in favor of retaining a test which, misnamed or not, leads to a
result contrary to current psychiatric concepts.
43. A. GoLDsEN , supra note 16, at 72-75. "It catches in its exculpatory net many persons
with mental aberration whom the knowledge tests miss, such as those whose mental processes
have been affected by longstanding epileptic seizured states. . . and perhaps even extreme
compulsive neuroses." Id. at 54.
44. Id. at 53-58. "The irresistible impulse test, added to the right and wrong rule, of course
gives much broader scope both to the expert witness in testifying on the accused's mental
condition and to the jury in assessing the presence or absence of responsibility." Id. at 54.
45. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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a point where its learning would compel us to require the states to eliminate
the right and wrong test from their criminal law. 6
In spite of the support for the M'Naughten test and irresistible impulse
test, the fact remains that Virginia is currently adhering to an insanity
defense which is based on the most restrictive test of criminal responsibil-
ity now in use. It is most restrictive in the sense that it defines insanity
solely in terms of impairment of cognitive capacity or intellectual capacity
to distinguish right from wrong. 7 Virginia has avoided some of the harsh
results of this restrictive test by broadening its scope through supplment-
ing it with the irresistible impulse doctrine. In those cases where the irre-
sistible impulse instruction is allowed,4" examination of the actor's volition
or self-control recognizes that mental illness may affect the actor's will and
emotions as well as his cognitive or intellectual capacity. 9 Authorities in
favor of broadening M'Naghten to take into account the volitional element
regard the irresistible impulse test as inadequate in that it does not extend
M'Naghten sufficiently. The concept of irresistibility as utilized by the
courts requires a total impairment of volitional capacity." The word
"impulse" implies that the defense is applicable only to those criminal acts
which have been suddenly and impulsively committed as distinguished
from insane propulsions that are accompanied by brooding or reflection. 5'
A survey of current authorities shows a disproportionate number ex-
tremely critical of the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse approaches." In
46. Id. at 800-01 (footnotes omitted). There has not been a recent direct ruling by the
Supreme Court as to what should constitute a charge in the issue of criminal responsibility
when a defense of insanity or mental illness has been interposed by an accused in a trial in
federal court. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d at 768. The M'Naghten test was held to be
constitutional in Thornhill v. Peyton, 285 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Va. 1968).
47. G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 11.
48. See notes 34 and 35 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that Virginia's
practice of excluding the doctrine of irresistible impulse in specific cases increases the likeli-
hood that the restrictiveness of M'Naghten will be retained.
49. G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 13.
50. Id. (citing Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 367,
375 (1955)).
51. G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 13 (citing Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-
53, Report 80 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1953)); see Durham v. United States,
214 F.2d 862, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1954); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comments at 157 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
52. Authorities critical of the M'Naghten rule: see, e.g., Second Circuit Annual Judicial
Conference, Panel Discussion, Insanity as a Defense, 37 F.R.D. 365, 380, 3:32 (1964); Berstein,
Criminal Responsibility: The Bar Must Lead in Law Reform, 50 A.B.A.J. 341 (1964); Bran-
cale, More on M'Naughten: A Psychiatrist's View, 65 DICK. L. REv. 277 (1961); Carroll &
Leopold, The Current Influence of Psychiatric Concepts in Determining Criminal Responsi-
bility in Pennsylvania, 31 TEMP. L.Q. 254 (1958); Dearman, Criminal Responsibility and
Insanity Tests: A Psychiatrist Looks at Three Cases, 47 VA. L. REv. 1388, 1397 (1961);
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fact, the criticism has been heavy since the day the rules were announced.
Naturally these rules draw criticism based on the method of development
and period of history in which they were developed. "Professor Sheldon
Glueck says the early insanity tests are not the result of sacred legal tradi-
tions or mature judicial or legislative deliberation. Rather he argues they
stem from judicial attempts to reduce complex concepts into simple rules
and, to a large extent, are the result of historical accident." Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in testimony before the Royal Commission on Capital Punish-
ment expressed the view that the M'Naghten rules are a sham. "[To
have rules which cannot be rationally justified except by process of inter-
pretation which distorts and often practically nullifies them, and to say the
corrective process comes by having the Governor . . . [decide] when the
consequences of the rule should not be enforced, is not a desirable sys-
tem."" Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued against precedent when rules of law
serve to suspend the state of psychological knowledge at the time the rules
were formulated.5
Even though the irresistible impulse doctrine does widen the scope of
exculpation under the M'Naghten test, this measure of responsibility is
inadequate from a psychiatric point of view."
[Ain unfortunate and misleading implication [is] that, where a crime is
committed as a result of emotional disorder due to insanity, it must have
been suddenly and impulsively committed after a sharp internal conflict. In
many cases, such as those of melancholia, this is not true at all. The sufferer
from this disease experiences a change of mood which alters the whole of his
existence. . . . The criminal act, in such circumstances, may be the reverse
of impulsive. It may be cooly and carefully prepared; yet it is still the act of
a madman. . . . [S]imilar states of mind are likely to lie behind the crimi-
Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Justice, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 331 (1955).
Authorities critical of the supplemental irresistible impulse test: see, e.g., Board,
Operational Criteria for Determining Criminal Responsibility, 61 COLUM. L. Rxv. 221, 224
(1961); Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness - Two Faces of the Same Coin, 22 U. Cm. L.
REv. 320, 321 (1955); Skeel, M'Naghten v. Durham, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. Rv. 330, 336 (1963).
53. Note, Modem Insanity Tests - Alternatives, 15 WAsHBURN L.J. 88, 92 (1976)(citing S.
GLUECK, MENTAL DisoRDER AND THE CRMINAL LAw 156-60 (1925)). The lower courts, instead
of appellate courts, formulated the tests and principles of law were confused with dicta. "Jury
instructions consisted of conflicting excerpts from prior opinions, assembled into a single test.
Thus although laying the foundation for present insanity tests, the early rules cannot be
regarded as inherently sacred or absolutely authoritative." Id. at 93.
54. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d at 766 (quoting Mr. Justice Frankfurter before the
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, supra note 50).
55. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d at 765; see Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting
Ground for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 41 IowA L. REv. 485 (1956).
56. See H. FINoARErrE, supra note 16; M. GuTrmAcHEn, supra note 16; G. MoRms, supra
note 8, at 11-14; see generally note 51 supra.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
nal act when murders are committed by persons suffering from schizophrenia
or paranoid psychoses . . . .5
The test reflects a traditional notion of compartmentalized personality"
which is contrary to most psychiatrists' view of the personality as an inte-
grated unit. 9 Similarly, the delusion concept which pervades any determi-
nation of insanity has been entangled in both the M'Naghten and irresisti-
ble impulse tests."0 This concept has been used as if one is capable of
singling out one symptom from a general pathologic process, largely in
paranoia and paranoid schizophrenia.6 ' Professor Glueck insists that to
make responsibility hinge on the presence or absence of delusions is to
assume too narrow and fragmented a view of mental illness and its effect
on conduct since delusion is not necessarily more significant in distorting
behavior than other "deranged mental dynamisms in the total pathological
context."" It is apparent that the approach utilized by Virginia is not
sufficient to include the various mental disorders which can seriously affect
the comprehension and control of behavior. Virginia courts decided long
ago to limit criminal responsibility and, consequently, psychiatry demands
that certain mental disorders be considered in the responsibility question.
It has been said that the M'Naghten rules are obsolete in theory and
arbitrarily restrictive in practice by limiting testimony of the psychiatrist
as an expert witness.13 What do the M'Naghten rules test? "Certainly not
mental disorder. They are a test of legal responsibility, and as used are
merely a device whereby the psychiatrist as a medical expert is made to
answer moral questions of right and wrong."64 The misleading implication
to the jury is that the psychiatrist is giving a scientific medical opinion to
questions which involve bona fide medical criteria. 5 The narrowness of the
traditional test makes it impossible to convey to the judge and jury the full
range of informative material necessary to assess defendant's responsi-
bility.66 Typically, the psychiatrist is told to state whether or not the
57. S. GLUECK, supra note 4, at 58 (citing Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, supra
note 50, at 110); see Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d at 873-74.
58. G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 11.
59. Id. (citing Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761, 775 (1956)).
60. S. GLUIECK, supra note 4, at 59; see generally S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1925).
61. S. GLUECK, supra note 4, at 59. The delusion symptom is not isolated from the entire
disease pattern as the use of this concept would suggest.
62. Id.
63. Dearman, supra note 3, at 1394.
64. Id. at 1393.
65. Id.
66. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 976-77 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see G. MoRms, supra
note 8, at 11.
[Vol. 13:397
VIRGINIA'S INSANITY DEFENSE
patient knew the difference between right and wrong at the time he com-
mitted the crime. This is a question which the psychiatrist cannot answer,
as he can only state whether or not the patient was suffering from a men-
tal illness." Because of the well recognized tendency of the M'Naghten
rules to handcuff the specialist, it can safely be concluded that they are
not effective in aiding the jury in making a determination of guilt when
insanity is pleaded as a defense.
The problem of ambiguous terminology of the M'Naghten test has in-
creased its vulnerability. Historically, the M'Naghten test has generated
uncertainty and confusion due to varying interpretations of the rule and
lack of definition or judicial construction of its terms." The key words of
the test have rarely been construed in judicial opinions. Courts have al-
most never defined "disease of the mind," although the remainder of the
test indicates that only the most severe conditions will qualify. 9 The use
of the word "known" has been subjected to scholarly criticism as referring
to formal cognition or intellectual awareness alone. 0 The word "wrong"
has also been criticized as ambiguous in that it is not stated whether this
applies to "legal wrong" or "moral wrong.""
The general assumption underlying the insanity defense is that it
enables society to distinguish between the cases "where a punitive-
correctional dispositon is appropriate and those in which a medical-
custodial disposition is the only kind that law should allow. 7 2 In this way,
society has drawn a dividing line between the criminal and the insane. The
question Virginia must face is whether the M'Naghten-irresistible impulse
approach is an appropriate method for determining this fine line. In light
67. Dearman, supra note 3, at 1394. In discussing the problems the Durham rule or product
test (see note 26 supra) were designed to reach, the court noted that psychiatrists were often
called as expert witnesses for their special knowledge of the problem of insanity and often
felt they were obliged to reach outside of their professional expertise in order to answer
questions of the traditional rules of M'Naghten. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 976.
68. Alternatives, supra note 26, at 97 (citing S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMI-
NAL LAW, at 187, 217, 226); see A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 45-58.
69. See, e.g., G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 12.
70. See, e.g., Id. Judge Bazelon has noted:
There is something quite curious about the manner in which both the M'Naghten and
irresistible impulse rules have been construed by the courts. Neither has been used
creatively in the manner we like to think represents the "genius of the common law."
Despite potential breadth of a word like "know" in the M'Naghten rule, for example
... no court has read it to mean more than "intellectually comprehend." And this
although we have long known that even the best intentioned of men often find them-
selves acting in ways and for reasons they cannot justify in rational terms.
S. GLUECK, supra note 4, at 46-47.
71. See, e.g., G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 13.
72. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, comments at 156 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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of the fact that there are so many psychiatrists in disagreement with it and
legal scholars criticizing its foundations and precepts, the inevitable con-
clusion is that the time for reform is past due.
IV. PROGRESS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Virginia has undergone so little change in the defense of insanity that it
is necessary to examine other jurisdictions which have searched for an
effective method of determining when criminal responsibility can be said
to exist.73 Traditionally, the federal courts applied M'Naghten exclu-
sively, 7 and later supplemented it with the irresistible impulse test.7 5 The
federal courts then directed their attention to the so-called Durham or
product rule " as a result of the highly controversial Durham decision."
Currently, all the circuits, except the First Circuit which has not spoken,
have rejected M'Naghten and the irresistible impulse test in favor of
modifications of the American Law Institute's formulation in the Model
Penal Code. 8
The most representative federal court on the issue of a proposal for
Virginia's insanity defense is the prestigious District of Columbia. The
District of Columbia traditionally had an approach to the insanity defense
similar to that of Virginia. The 1886 case of United States v. Lee,7 together
with the 1929 case of Smith v. United States,0 stated the test of insanity
in terms of right and wrong and the irresistible impulse. Due to the dissat-
isfaction of this approach, Judge Bazelon in the landmark opinion of
73. For the purposes of this article, the federal circuits will be examined since they have
progressed through various stages to reach their current approaches. Consequently, they offer
more practical knowledge in the effectiveness of the various tests.
74. Note, Modem Insanity Tests - Alternatives, 15 WASHBURN L.J. at 96 n.92 (citing Lee
v. United States, 91 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1937)).
75. Id. at 96 n.93 (citing Merrill v. United States, 338 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1964)).
76. See note 26 supra.
77. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The federal courts have generally rejected the product
test. See United States v. Malafonte, 357 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1966); Carter v. United States,
332 F.2d 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1964); Snider v. Smith, 187 F. Supp. 299
(E.D. Va. 1960), affl'd, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961).
78. See note 26 supra. Those circuits either applying the proposed or modified version of
the ALI test are as follows:
United States. v. Kohlman, 469 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Currens, 290
F.2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1961); United States v. McGirr, 434 F.2d 844 (4th Cir. 1970); Blake
v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720
(6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Sennett, 505 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1974); Pope v. United
States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970);
Wioh v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
79. 15 D.C. (4 Mackey) 489, 496, 54 Am. Rep. 293 (1886).
80. 59 App. D.C. 144, 36 F.2d 548 (1929).
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Durham v. United States' adopted the "product" rule which exculpates
from criminal responsibility those whose forbidden acts were the product
of a mental disease or defect.2 In answer to the severe problems of the
"product" rule, the District of Columbia abandoned this rule in 19721
noting that despite its problems it had made a positive contribution to
jurisprudence. "The rule [M'Naghten] as reformulated in Durham per-
mitted medical experts to testify on medical matters properly put before
the jury for its consideration, and to do so without the confusion that
many, perhaps most, experts experienced from testimony structured under
the M'Naghten rule.""4 The court in Brawner viewed Durham as an at-
tempt to alleviate problems stemming from the older tests and, in consid-
ering the advantages of the ALI proposal, 5 adopted a modified version of
81. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
82. The Durham rule had many unforeseen problems. Psychiatrists favored the decision
for expanding the area of inquiry and communication of the medical expert as a witness.
Lawyers, however, criticized the Durham rule as being a "non-rule." The test does not direct
the jury to pathological factors that are of concern to the law: impairment of reason and of
control. G. Moms, supra note 8, at 14-15 (citing W. LAFAVE AND A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW 288 (1972)); see Roche, Criminality And Mental Illness - Two Faces Of The
Same Coin, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 320, 324 (1955). Consequently, this rule was not widely
accepted. For purposes of this discussion, we must conclude that the problems developing
from the Durham rule were substantial and, therefore, this rule should not be considered in
Virginia.
83. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
84. Id. at 977. The court noted that this positive aspect of Durham was retained when the
American Law Institute undertook to analyze the problem and proposed a different formula-
tion. Id.
85. The Brawner court considered amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the following:
(1) The American Civil Liberties Union Fund of the National Capital Area.
(2) National Legal Aid and Defender Assn.
(3) The National District Attorneys Assn.
(4) Public Defender Service and The Georgetown Legal Intern Project
(5) American Psychiatric Assn.
(6) Professor David L. Chambers, H
(7) American Psychological Assn.
(8) The Bar Assn. of the District of Columbia.
86. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 973. The Brawner court stated:
The law provides that a jury shall bring in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
if, at the time of the criminal conduct, the defendant, as a result of mental disease or
defect, either lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law, or lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.
Mental disease [or defect] includes any abnormal condition of the mind, regardless
of its medical label, which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and
substantially impairs behavior controls. The term "behavior controls" refers to the
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The American Law Institute developed a rule which has become the
dominant force in the law pertaining to the defense of insanity and is
destined to be viewed as a sensible compromise between those favoring the
traditional rules and those who favor the "radical-appearing" Durham
rule." Members of the ALI indicated the difficulties or harshness of the
M'Naghten rule and the irresistible impulse test can and must be cor-
rected. "The law must recognize that when there is no black or white, it
must content itself with different shades of gray."" "The JI rule is eclec-
tic in spirit, partaking of the moral focus of M'Naghten, the practical
accommodation of the 'control rules' [a more exact term for irresistible
impulse rules] and responsive, at the same time, to a relatively modem,
forward-looking view of what is encompassed in 'knowledge.' "89 Dean
Goldstein explains the ALI test:
This test is a modernized and much improved rendition of M'Naghten and
the "control" tests. It substitutes "appreciate" for "know," thereby indicat-
ing a preference for the view that a sane offender must be emotionally as well
as intellectually aware of the significance of his conduct. Arid it uses the word
"conform" instead of "control," while avoiding any reference to the mislead-
ing words "irresistible impulse." In addition, it requires only "substantial"
incapacity, thereby eliminating the occasional references in the older cases
to "complete" or "total" destruction of the normal capacity of the defen-
dant."
Chief Judge Haynsworth of the Fourth Circuit accepted the ALI rule as
the preferred formulation9' on the basis of the balance between cognition
and volition. This balance demands an unrestricted inquiry into the whole
personality of a defendant. "Its verbiage is understandable by psychia-
trists [sic]; it imposes no limitation upon their testimony, and yet, to a
substantial extent, it avoids a diagnostic approach and leaves the jury free
to make its findings in terms of a standard which society prescribes and
juries may apply."9
processes and capacity of a person to regulate and control his conduct and his actions.
In considering whether the defendant had a mental disease [oz defect] at the time
of the unlawful act with which he is charged you may consider testimony in this case
concerning the development, adaptation and functioning of the3e mental and emo-
tional processes and behavior controls.
Id. at 1008 (Appendix B). For an intensive discussion of the specific elements of the ALI
modification adopted see id. at 990-95.
87. A. GOLSTEIN, supra note 16, at 93.
88. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 72, at 158.
89. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 979.
90. G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 17 (quoting A. GoLSTEtN, supra note 16, at 87).
91. United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1968).
92. Id. Judge Murrah of the Tenth Circuit stated that the ALI rule should go far in bridging
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Circuit Judge Leventhal in the Brawner opinion stated that the ALI test
retained the core requirement of a meaningful relationship between the
mental illness and the incident charged. The language of the test is suffi-
ciently common to both professions [psychiatry and law] so that its use
in the courtroom or in preparation for trial permits communication be-
tween judges, lawyers, experts, and jurymen. The parties can communi-
cate without the use of a "vocabulary that is either stilted or stultified, or
conducive to a testimonial mystique permitting expert dominance and
encroachment on the jury's function. 9 3 Commentators also have expressed
favorable views on the ALI formulation."
The ALI draft has had its critics, too." Some have contended that the
important words in the ALI test such as "substantial" and "appreciate"
are vague and undefined. Judge Bazelon, in his concurrence and dissent
in Brawner, stated that the problem with the word "product" in the Dur-
ham rule may not be solved by using the word "result" in the ALI test."
Others fear that the requirement of less than total incapacity expands the
number of insanity acquittals which tends to counteract society's interest
in crime deterrence. 7 Dean Goldstein also points to the danger and proba-
bility that lawyers and judges will "continue to put only conclusionary
questions to experts, usually cast in the words of the insanity test itself."9
Experts will come to believe the court is not interested in a detailed de-
scription of the defendant's mental state but only in the answers to the test
questions. Dean Goldstein, therefore, argues that there is a high probabil-
ity that the problem of presenting expert testimony in a limited manner
is likely to remain." In fact, Chief Judge Bazelon, author of the Durham
opinion, agreed that the Durham test should be abandoned, but ques-
the gulf between psychiatry and the law as well as giving the trial judge a definition which
he can articulate to the lay jury. Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d at 430.
93. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 983.
94. Wechsler, Codification of the Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1425 (1968); Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond,
50 CAL. L. Rnv. 189, 191 (1962); Bennett, The Insanity Defense - A Perplexing Problem of
Criminal Justice, 16 LA. L. REv. 484, 490-91 (1956).
95. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1010-39 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Goldstein, The Brawner Rule - Why? or No More Nonsense on Non Sense
in the Criminal Law, Please!, [1973] WASH. U.L.Q. 126; Kuh, The Insanity Defense - An
Effort to Combine Law and Reason, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 771, 797-99 (1962).
96. G. Momus, supra note 8, at 17; see United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1010-39
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 75 (9th Cir. 1970) (Trask, J., with whom Cham-
bers, Barnes, Koelsch, Carter, and Kilkenny, J.J. joined, dissenting).
98. A. GOLDSTEIN, suppa note 16, at 94.
99. Id.
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tioned whether the adopted formulation would be able to solve the prob-
lems. °0 Several states have expressly rejected the ALI test.'0 '
V. PROPOSAL: LEGISLATIVE INVOLVEMENT
Arguments have been made against legislative enactment of any specific
insanity test. The arguments against legislative enactment of any specific
insanity test that have generally been based on the suggestion that the
problem of the mentally ill offender is "not soluble through manipulation
of the legal rules of responsibility."'0 2 Indeed, in light of the issues underly-
ing the determination of criminal responsibility, 3 it appears that the prob-
lems of criminal responsibility cannot be completely dissolved by adopting
any particular insanity test. A perfect test may be impossible at this stage
of our jurisprudence. Chief Judge Bazelon stated in Brawner that it was
fine if the adoption of the ALI test produces some improvement in the
quality of adjudication of the responsibility issue, but pointed to far more
important practical questions which should not be buried in the search for
the perfect word choice. 04
These limitations should not be viewed as sufficient to prevent legisla-
tive action in Virginia. Reasons abound for the formulation of a new test
for the insanity defense. The American Bar Foundation asserts:
Granting that the "modern" tests of criminal responsibility indeed fail to
lead to a socio-legal "promised land," the problem with such observations is
that they often become the parlance of those who are unwilling to advocate
or even entertain the thought of any "real change" in our conceptions and
institutions such as might bring the criminal justice system closer to ideals
100. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1010-39. "We are unanimous in our decision
today to abandon the formulation of criminal responsibility adopted eighteen years ago [in
Durham] .... But on the whole I fear that the change made by the Court today is primarily
one of form rather than of substance." Id. at 1010. He also was critical of the fact that the
ALI formulation continued to require that the accused have a "mental disease" as a prere-
quisite condition of non-responsibility. He argued the term "mental disease" is too entangled
with the medical model to be useable as a legal concept. Id. at 1028.
101. Some of these include: State v. Malumphy, 105 Ariz. 200, 461 P.2d 677 (1969); State
v. Harkness, 160 N.W.2d 324 (Iowa 1968); State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 72., 152 A.2d 50, 68-69
(1959); State v. Reece, 79 Wash. 2d 453, 486 P.2d 1088 (1971).
102. G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 25 (citing Diamond, From Durham to Browner, A Futile
Journey, [1973] WASH. U.L.Q. 109).
103. See notes 16 and 23 supra and accompanying text.
104. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1039 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). These practical questions speak to the procedural problems involved;
specifically, the capabilities of the judge, jury and expert in arriving at desired results in a
fair and rational manner while functioning within the legal frmework. Id.
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of consistency and rationality, and tend to justify the principle of inertia,
espousing old rules and formulations by default. 10 5
Critical decisions affecting the lives of criminal defendants face the court
everyday. These decisions cannot be postponed. "They cannot await an
indefinite future time when a standard for personal blameworthiness
might be scientifically established. Any legislative judgment improving
the administration of criminal justice, even to a minor degree, is warranted
now.'10
6
This article calls for reform in the approach of the insanity defense and
the determination of criminal responsibility. The emphasis is on change,
no matter whether initiated by the Virginia courts or legislature. The con-
troversial insanity defense has seen little change over the years; conse-
quently, precedent is weighted heavily against reform. For these reasons
Virginia courts will likely look to the legislature.' Hence, the Virginia
General Assembly will probably have to initiate the necessary reform.
Current deficiencies of the Virginia system would be greatly remedied
by the adoption of a modified formulation of the ALI test. The Brawner
court conducted an exhaustive survey of the relevant psychiatric and legal
considerations"' and was unanimous in its decision to abandon the Dur-
ham rule. Virginia should look for a modification of the ALI test which
addresses the problems noted in Chief Judge Bazelon's dissent.
105. G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 25, 26 (quoting American Bar Foundation, The Mentally
Disabled and the Law 392 (rev. ed., Brakel and Rook 1971).
106. G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 26.
107. Several jurisdictions have adhered to the M'Naghten rule, despite legal criticism,
believing a change of this nature is properly made by the legislature. People v. Nash, 52 Cal.
2d 36, 338 P.2d 416 (1959); People v. Johnson, 169 N.Y.S.2d 217, 13 Misc. 2d 376 (1957). But
see People v. Drew, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978). In this recent decision (Sept. 26, 1978), Justice
Tobriner stated that California would reject the M'Naghten test used for over a century in
favor of the American Law Institute's test. "The deficiencies of that test have long been
apparent, and judicial attempts to reinterpret or evade the limitations of M'Naghten have
proven inadequate." Id. The only barrier to the adoption of the manifestly superior ALI test
was the "repeated judicial declarations that any change in the M'Naghten rule requires
legislative action." Id. at 282. The court disagreed with the "concept that an extended line
of judicial decisions, accompanied by legislative inaction, can freeze the evolution of judicial
principles, divesting the courts of authority to overturn their prior decisions" and stated that
the judiciary has the responsibility for legal doctrine which it has created. Id. at 282.
The power of the court to reshape judicial doctrine does not authorize us to overturn
constitutionally valid statutes. But as Justice Mosk explained in his concurring opin-
ion in People v. Kelly ... the M'Naghton rule is not an integral part of the statutory
structure of California criminal law. The Legislature has never enacted the M'Naghton
rule as a test of insanity .... Thus replacement of the M'Naghton rule with the ALI
test will not contradict or nullify any legislative enactment.
Id. at 283.
108. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 975-89.
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It is hereby proposed that Virginia adopt the following modification of
the ALl test put forth by Grant Morris in 1975:
A person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if, as a result of impair-
ment of his mental or emotional processes or behavior controls, he lacked,
at the time of such conduct, substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law.' 9
One of the major criticisms of the formulation adopted in Brawner was that
because the model was cast in medical model terminology, i.e., "mental
disease or defect," the legal determination to be made by the jury is, in
fact, made by the psychiatrists. The psychiatrist actually makes the deci-
sion through his medical determination of mental illness or disease. So, the
defendant's responsibility seems to turn on whether or not the experts have
called his condition a specific disease. But, "[t]here is no reason to tie the
legal concept of responsibility to the medical model of mental illness,
especially when the validity of that medical model is seriously questioned
by some eminent psychiatrists. . . ."110 The proposal eliminates the medi-
cal model, substituting in its stead the words "if, as a result of impairment
of his mental or emotional processes or behavior controls." This should
permit a jury to consider impairment arising from physiological, emo-
tional, social or cultural sources."' Morris argues that this language will
still permit psychiatrists to testify on the accused's mental. condition using
their own nomenclature, yet in conjunction with trial court instructions
juries can be informed that determination of criminal responsibility in-
volves more than blind acceptance of psychiatric opinion."'
Adoption of this formulation will retain advantages the ALl official pro-
posal has over the traditional M'Naghten - irresistible impulse approach"3
currently in use in Virginia and will also improve the inherent problems
between the jury determination and the tendency for the psychiatric ex-
pert to dominate this decision.
109. G. Morris, supra note 8, at 27. For a thorough discussion of the word choice see id. at
28-31. Paragraph (2) of the ALl test (see note 26 supra) which excludes "socio-paths" is
rejected since by current psychiatric knowledge it is not clear whether they are included in
the definition of insanity. It is suggested that each case be tried on an individual basis with
psychiatric and lay testimony heard by a jury.
110. G. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 28 (quoting United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 626
(D.C. Cir. 1971)(Bazelon, C.J., concurring)). The possible deference to psychiatric judgment
is unwise for psychiatrists themselves do not agree on what constitutes mental illness. G.
MORRIS, supra note 8, at 28.
111. Id. at 29.
112. Id. at 29, 30.
113. See notes 51 & 88 supra and acompanying text.
[Vol. 13:397
VIRGINIA'S INSANITY DEFENSE
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
Although the proposal of this article is a necessary change in Virginia
law, one which the legislature should address, honesty requires it to be
viewed as an essential short-run improvement. Obviously, the ALI has
some problems which have been adequately criticized by those who have
experience in the search for a perfect test."' It should be stressed at this
point that although these criticisms suggest the test is not perfect, by no
means is the criticism sufficient to support legislative inaction and the
resultant adherence to an archaic Virginia test. The Virginia legislature,
in adopting this proposal, should take careful notice of Chief Judge Baze-
lon's advice: "But we cannot allow our search for the perfect choice of
words to deflect our attention from the far more important practical ques-
tions.""' The ultimate solution is going to require looking at the criminal
procedure involved in the insanity defense and perhaps may require a
change of attitude in determining where and how society wants to draw
the line in criminal responsibility.
It has been said that "[u]nder present legal arrangements, the point at
which the theoretical debate over criminal responsibility becomes opera-
tive in the real world is the point at which it makes a difference to the
jury.""' Certainly, a major area of dissatisfaction in all insanity tests pro-
posed has been that it does not remedy the problem of the expert witness
and his interaction with the jury. The interaction required in this context
is unique from other uses of expert testimony. A medical expert certainly
is not forced to entangle his expertise with such difficult moral questions.
Once a test has been adopted which adequately utilizes current psychiatric
knowledge, as the proposed test should do, attention will be focused on the
apparent weak link in this unique legal setting. As the system stands
today, the courts may be asking too much from the jury.
The Simon studies regarding juror's responses to mock trials applying
the insanity defense"7 have given some insight into the capabilities of
114. See note 94 supra.
115. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 1039. (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
116. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 67 (1967).
117. Id. Rita Simon's study of 1967, like similar studies involving jurors has some weak-
nesses in design and technique due to the difficulty in recreating the jury trial setting over
many test runs and juror samples. The use of recorded trials has been criticized as well as
the fact that the jurors were informed at the outset of the experiment that their verdicts would
not affect the defendant's fate. All evidence of the experimenters that the verdicts of experi-
mental juries are comparable to the verdicts that real juries would reach in similar situations
is indirect. Id. at 34-42. It should also be noted that these studies require careful reading.
Apparently, those conducting the study did not interpret their data in such a clear cut fashion
as some commentators have noted. At most the test should lead to further inquiry.
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jurors in the insanity defense. This study together with two other studies
in this area"' have been interpreted to demonstrate:
[T]he jury (1) does not understand the code of the psychiatrist, (2) does not
understand the legal framework, and (3) applies its own reasoning to the case
to the extent of regarding its own fears as more important than the elaborate
judicial system. In other words, the layman, the juror, puts his own "value"
on the asocial behavior."9
Assuming these to be true, the conclusion that the method for determining
criminal responsibility is haphazard, at best, may be reached.
By adopting the proposed insanity defense, Virginia will achieve a great
substantive improvement. Any criticisms are likely to call for tailoring the
new test to the jury. This has been the approach in the past. In the future,
we may see a shift in this emphasis by accommodating the psychiatric
profession in their much needed assessment with increased focus on tailor-
ing the jury to this specific procedure. This long-run procedural solution
will not be addressed in this article. However, a number of proposals fore-
cast the search for something beyond the articulation of an insanity test.
Such proposals include abolishing the insanity defense2 " and adopting
instead either a bifurcated trial procedure with the jury determining who
did the act in the first phase and either a judge or panel of experts making
the disposition determination in the second phase,' or establishing educa-
tive programs for prospective jurors to aid them in this unique determina-
tion. 21
118. Arens, Granfield, and Susman, Jurors, Jury Charges and Insaniiy, 14 CAm. U.L. REv.
1, 11 (1965); James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 65 AM. J. Soc. 563, 565 (1959).
119. Comment, The Psychiatrist's Role in Determining Accountability for Crimes: The
Public Anxiety and an Increasing Expertise, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 380, 390 (1969)(footnotes
omitted).
120. See Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense" - Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853
(1963); Pugh, The Insanity Defense in Operation: A Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham
and Brawner, [1973] WASH. U.L.Q. 87, 105-08. But see Brady, Abolish the Insanity Defense
- No!, 8 Hous. L. Rzv. 629 (1971).
121. See Second Circuit Annual Judicial Conference, Panel Discussion, Insanity as a
Defense, 37 F.R.D. 365, 369-75 (1964); Thompson, The Future of the Insanity Defense in
Illinois, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 359 (1977); Shwedel and Roether, The Disposition Hearing: An
Alternative to the Insanity Defense, 49 J. URB. L. 711 (1972).
122. Any change in this regard will bring some difficult problems to the surface: (1) The
potential constitutional violation of due process and the right to trial by jury on each and
every element of the crime.
(2) The symbolic importance of allowing the jury as representatives of society to make
the responsibility determination. See Comment, Due Process and Bifurcated Trials: A
Double-Edged Sword, 66 Nw. L. REV. 327 (1971).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Current Virginia law on the test of insanity poses major problems in
determining criminal responsibility by a fair and rational process. Legal
scholars, as well as psychiatrists, have severely criticized the M'Naghten
and irresistible impulse approach in determining criminal responsibility.
This approach has been shown to be unrealistic in the light of present day
knowledge of medical psychology and suspect in terms of recent scholarly
opinions on the foundations of criminal law. In seeking truth in the area
of criminal intent and the defense of insanity, Virginia must determine
criminal responsibility on a basis which is more in tune with the realities
of human behavior as demonstrated by the psychiatric fields. For it is only
in this way that Virginia can hope to achieve justice in punishment or
treatment.
The reform necessary in Virginia merits legislative action because crimi-
nal responsibility is, and should be, a matter which raises serious moral
questions. In the search for an improved test, the Virginia legislature
should consider progressive jurisdictions such as the federal circuits which
offer a great deal of experience in the law of the insanity defense. An
appraisal of these jurisdictions, specifically the District of Columbia, has
resulted in this comment's proposal that Virginia adopt a modification of
the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code formulation. This ap-
proach is a modem attempt to draw a sensible compromise between the
various traditional tests. Adoption of the formulation presented in this
comment will go a long way in solving Virginia's problems in determining
criminal responsibility. The proposed test is not a perfect one and it will,
no doubt, have its critics. However, the advantages of this test over the
current Virginia test indicate that these criticisms are not sufficient to
support legislative inaction.
William C. Waddell III
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